Forcing contract tracing apps upon the public may be the first wave of an all out war on privacy.
Consider avoiding all technology that real-time tracks & shares your location.
Saying ‘no’ is a superpower that we all share.
https://nypost.com/2020/05/04/coronavirus-contact-tracing-app-could-be-forced-on-all-uk-visitors/ (uses analytics)
If you want to fight back - Choose to be vocal about saying no. Discuss with friends & family in all social channels. Immediately contact your politician. Avoid supportive purchases.
@theprivacyfoundation what do you think about ppl voluntarily using a #privacy-respecting #ContactTracing app to pre-empt a forced privacy abusive tool? bluetrace.io could almost fit the bill. It uses bluetooth to avoid a centralized db, but it forced ph# disclosure so still needs to evolve.
@theprivacyfoundation if a privacy-respecting app catches on quickly enough, it could take wind from the sails of the more oppressive variants (which would come from #Apple & #Google)
@resist1984 Normally, we have a "do this if better" approach to all things, as perfectionism gets us nowhere. However, in the case of all mass surveillance mechanisms, we have a firm do-not-support.
People should not have to choose between total surveillance or total surveillance.
@theprivacyfoundation an app could generate a unique #, exchange it w/another instance over bluetooth, & keep a local db on the device. If someone is positive, they could publish the unique numbers they crossed paths with post-infection. Those ppl could voluntarily decide whether to anonymously publish their list if unique numbers after the contact point.
@theprivacyfoundation So i think the privacy problem is solvable. But note that Bruce Schneier makes an interesting case for #ContactTracing apps being /ineffective/: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/05/me_on_covad-19_.html which is perhaps a better case than the privacy case.
@resist1984 Agree with Bruce that the ineffectiveness is relevant and should be forefront in the argument.